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This paper constructs an endogenous growth model, applicable largely to developing 
countries, based on human capital accumulation in which education is publicly provided 
and financed, and schooling is compulsory. Public investment in human and physical 
capital are financed from taxes on wage and capital income, and consumption. The 
equilibrium growth properties of the model are examined and the steady-state effects of 
education and fiscal policy are derived. The specification of the human capital production 
function and the strength of labour supply effects are shown to be important for the 
magnitude of steady-state outcomes. Simulations illustrate the model's properties. 
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    1 Introduction
A central tenet of education policy in developing countries is that expansion of
school enrolments is desirable, for reasons of social justice, and because economic
prosperity is perceived to be fostered by the accumulation of human capital via
education.1 This paper examines the growth eﬀects of human capital investment
achieved through publicly-provided, compulsory education, ﬁnanced from income
and consumption taxes. The eﬀects on labour supply of higher tax rates, in
addition to general equilibrium eﬀects on wages and prices, are examined.
Given the aims of the paper, a number of assumptions need to be adopted
which diﬀer from those in the growth literature. Since Lucas (1988, 1990) edu-
cation has been extensively examined in the context of models in which individ-
uals allocate their time to education within an inter-temporal utility-maximising
framework.2 However, it is not obvious that this framework is the best way to
capture education decisions in most developing countries. The theoretical lit-
erature on human capital and growth is generally separate from that on ﬁscal
policy and growth. However, any analysis of the growth impact of state-provided
education cannot be conducted independently of the ﬁnancing implications, as
dictated by the government budget constraint.3
Section 2 describes the basic structure of the model (with further details
regarding dynamics set out in the Appendix). Section 3 examines the eﬀects on
equilibrium growth of changes in education policy. Section 4 provides numerical
policy simulations to investigate the various policy trade-oﬀs in more detail. Brief
conclusions are in Section 5.
1In China for example, where education expansion has been rapid, the government now
claims that its nine-year compulsory education programme covers 73% of “opulated area”. A
problem with many developing countries is that, despite having compulsory education, partic-
ipation rates are low.
2Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Topel (1999) provide reviews of much of this literature.
3Models of ﬁscal policy and growth recognise the government budget constraint, though
relatively few examine taxes alongside productivity-enhancing or utility-enhancing public ex-
penditures. Studies include Barro (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Cashin (1995),
Devarajan et al (1996) and Capolupo (2000). With the exception of Capolupo, human capital
is either excluded or treated as a private decision in these papers. All these papers assume
exogenous labour supply. Models of taxation and growth in which government expenditures
have no output or utility eﬀects include King and Rebelo, (1990), Rebelo, (1991), Mendoza et
al (1997), Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998). These allow for endogenous labour supply. For
example, Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998) demonstrate that the nature of leisure is important
for growth predictions, depending on whether leisure requires raw labour time, quality time
(time and human capital inputs) or home production (where physical capital inputs are also
required).
12 The Structure of The Model
Modelling ﬁscal and education policy impacts on growth in an LDC context
requires several assumptions that diﬀer from those relevant to a more developed
country. The majority of individuals who currently receive education in LDCs
do so in public primary or secondary schools, frequently within a compulsory
education regime. For those individuals not currently receiving education, this
is typically because public education is unavailable rather than because families’
utility-maximising calculus leads them to choose lower levels of education.4
Governments in LDCs also undertake substantial physical capital investment
in the form of infrastructure which may be important for private sector productiv-
ity. Indeed, in many LDCs, despite recent market-orientated reforms, substantial
commercial and especially investment activity is either undertaken, or controlled
at the margin, by government, compared with a typical developed country. The
allocation of revenues to public physical capital investment therefore needs to
be included in the analysis. However, the model abstracts from private sector
investment. This allows the analysis to focus on the issues of primary interest,
namely the response of growth to publicly funded and provided human capital
investment.5 It results in a model analogous to Barro (1990) but where output
is a function of human capital and public physical capital rather than private and
public physical capital. To simplify the exposition, depreciation of human and
physical capital is ignored.
Unlike Barro (1990) and similar models, labour supply is endogenous. Though
choices between income and leisure may seem less relevant in an LDC context,
many individuals face choices between income earned in the taxed sector and
income (including subsistence activities) from the untaxed sector, or leisure. In
analysing output growth, the present model focuses on labour supplied to the
taxed sector and labels all other activities as leisure. In this broader sense, en-
dogenous labour supply choices are relevant in LDCs. Since untaxed activities by
an individual involve the application of the same human capital, leisure is mod-
elled, following Mendoza et al (1997), as quality time, that is, time augmented
by education.
It is assumed that individuals maximise their utility within each period but do
not maximise inter-temporally. This reﬂects both the fact that poor individuals
with low levels of education are unlikely to make sophisticated inter-temporal
calculations and, since there is no private investment or education in the model,
there is little to be gained from adopting an inter-temporal utility maximisation
4However, in some LDC contexts, especially in rural agriculture, families demonstrate a
preference not to send their children to school, even when available and compulsory, due to
preceptions that this reduces family income.
5It is recognised that in some LDCs, education is publicly funded but privately provided,
via the use of voucher schemes.
2framework.6
2.1 Production and Investment
The model is a closed-economy general equilibrium model with endogenous
labour supply, in which a single individual maximises utility from consumption of
as i n g l eﬁnal good and leisure. The representative individual is initially endowed
with raw labour time, N, which may be augmented by education to form hu-
man capital, H. In addition, homogeneous physical capital, K, is distributed to
the representative individual. This captures the notion that individuals beneﬁt
from infrastructure and, as discussed further below, can be taxed on the imputed
beneﬁts from that consumption.
Private sector production of the ﬁnal good, Q, in each period can be used





where uq is the proportion of human capital devoted to production of Q.
The government raises revenue from factor and consumption taxes, and
spends it on three functions. First, it purchases, at market prices, an amount Qh
used as an input into human capital production together with an appropriated
fraction of labour time, uh. Adopting the Cobb-Douglas form, the production





The inclusion of Qh in (2) is analogous to the use of physical capital by, for
example, King and Rebelo (1990) and Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998).8
The government undertakes physical capital investment in the form of a
private (as opposed to public) capital good, whereby the government purchases,
again at market prices, an amount of ﬁnal output equal to Qk.9 To capture the
6In this respect the present model is analogous to the Solow-Swan model in which savings
are a ﬁxed proportion of income. Although private savings are zero here, the private-good
nature of public investment and the compulsory nature of educational time inputs, together
with tax-ﬁnancing, ensure that taxation and education are analogous to a compulsory savings
proportion determined by government. There is the additional complication of possible tax
disincentive eﬀects on labour supply depending on the form of tax used.
7Throughout the following analysis, time subscripts are suppressed for convenience.
8As in these models, this property (in particular, the value of αh) is important for the
growth eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. However, unlike these models Q is not deﬁned here exclusively
as a capital good and can represent educational inputs of a capital or recurrent nature.
9It can be argued that some government investment, for example on infrastructure, should
be treated as a public good. However, Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) argue,
with support from empirical evidence, that government expenditures are dominated by goods
with quasi-private characteristics and are typically subject to congestion.
3beneﬁts of this physical capital to the consumer, the model adopts the device of
distributing this to the individual at the start of each period.
2.2 Tax Revenue
Tax revenue not used in the production of human and physical capital is returned
to the individual in the form of an untaxed transfer payment, D. This is designed
to reﬂect the fact that much public expenditure in LDCs is more likely to aﬀect
consumption than productivity. Total revenue, R, is divided among the three
expenditures in proportions θj, (j = k,h,d)a sf o l l o w s :
Qk = dK = θkR/p
Qh = θhR/p
D = θdR =( 1− θk − θh)R
(3)
where, p is the tax-inclusive consumer price of Q.
The government balances its budget in each period, raising revenue by taxing
factor incomes and consumption. As with most education systems in practice,
human capital inputs into human capital production are not directly taxed in the
model. The implicit income derived from the public capital, distributed to the
individual, is taxed. It may be thought more appropriate to treat the private
returns from the ownership of such infrastructure capital as untaxed. In practice,
however, the consumption of this type of capital, such as road infrastructure,
requires the use of private consumption goods (such as vehicles) which are taxed,
so that capital is eﬀectively taxed indirectly.10
Total tax revenue is given by:
R = trrK + twwuqH + tcp
0Q
= trrK + twwHq + tcp
0Q (4)
where tw,t r are the proportional income tax rates on gross wage and rental
incomes respectively; tc is the proportional ad valorem tax rate on consumption
of Q;a n dw and r are the pre-tax wage rate and rental per unit respectively. In
addition, p
0 = p/(1+tc) is the tax-exclusive producer price of Q,a n dHq = uqH
is human capital used in the production of Q. For convenience, p is normalised
at unity, such that p
0 =1 /(1 + tc).
2.3 Consumption and Labour Supply
The representative individual maximises a Cobb-Douglas utility function in each
period, expressed in terms of consumption and leisure (the latter deﬁned to
10See Brennan and Buchanan (1980) for explicit modelling of this relationship. They high-
light a number of taxes on privately produced consumption goods which de facto tax individ-
uals’ consumption of publicly provided capital.
4include all activities not giving rise to taxable incomes, as discussed above).
Deﬁne ul =1− uh − uq as the proportion of human capital devoted to leisure.





where Qc is the amount of Q consumed by the representative individual. For
the reasons given above, this speciﬁc a t i o n( i nc o m m o nw i t han u m b e ro fo t h e r
endogenous growth models) treats leisure as quality time. That is, it involves
time and human capital as inputs; see Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998).11
It follows that the individual’s full income, M, is given by:
M = r(1 − tr)K + w(1 − tw)(1− uh)H + D (6)
and, using standard results for Cobb-Douglas utility, the demands for goods and
leisure are:12
Qc = αcM/p (7)
h =( 1 − αc)M/{w(1 − tw)} (8)
Finally, the model’s adding-up condition, expressed in terms of gross incomes
and producer prices, requires that:
wuqH + rK = p
0Q (9)
This ensures that the total value of output is equal to the total value of factor
incomes, consistent with constant returns to scale. In addition, the Cobb-Douglas
production function implies that the labour income share is αq = wuqH/pQ and
1 − αq = rK/pQ is the share of capital in total income. Physical and human
capital endowments expand each period in response to public investment and
taxation decisions, though human capital used in production is endogenous via
t h ec h o i c eo fuq.
2.4 Basic Properties
Several general features of the model can usefully be stated here. First, since
there are no private savings, uniform taxation of both sources of income at rate,
11The human capital endowment can be thought of as raw labour time, N, augmented by
education, such that H = BN , where in each period B represents the labour-augmenting
skills acquired through education (with the initial value of B normalised to 1).
12In the absence of private investment, no borrowing or lending is allowed. Also the existence
of the transfer payment means that it is possible to have a corner solution where the individual
does not work, so (8) applies only if the wage rate exceeds a threshold level.
5ty, is equivalent to a consumption tax at rate tc/(1 + tc). This is evident from
the adding up constraint in (9) such that:






Secondly, the absence of private investment ensures that the usual distorting
eﬀects of capital taxes are absent. Physical capital is publicly purchased (out
of tax revenues) and is transferred costlessly to the individual. Hence, rental
income can be thought of as a transfer which may be taxed at rate tr which has
no direct incentive eﬀects on accumulation. However, a secondary labour supply
eﬀect can arise via responses of uq to changes in the individual’s full income; see
equation (6).
Thirdly, in addition to the growth-enhancing eﬀects of compulsory savings,
there is a growth-inhibiting eﬀect of taxation on labour supply. In analysing the
impact of alternative taxes, it is therefore important to separate these eﬀects.
Finally, unconditional transfers, like government consumption expenditures in the
Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) models, are utility-enhancing
but do not aﬀect private sector production.
The dynamic properties of the model arise from the government’s accu-
m u l a t i o nf u n c t i o n sf o rp h y s i c a la n dh u m a nc a p i t a l . T h el a t t e ra c t sa sl a b o u r -
augmenting technical progress, raising eﬀective endowments of human capital.
Since education and physical investment are funded from tax revenue, the dy-
namics are crucially determined by tax revenue, output and factor inputs. As with
most endogenous growth models, the primary concern is whether the steady-state
growth rate of per capita income is constant or diminishing in the absence of
exogenous technical progress. Using the dot notation to indicate proportional
changes, and letting asterisks denote equilibrium values, steady-state growth in
the present model requires:
˙ Q
∗ = ˙ K
∗ = ˙ H
∗ = ˙ R
∗ (11)
This ensures that the allocation of resources between the government and the
private sector is in equilibrium.13 The Appendix examines dynamic properties in
further detail, showing that the model does display equilibrium or steady-state
growth with positive ˙ Q∗, and that a shock to the model results in subsequent
convergence towards a new equilibrium.
3 Policy Eﬀects on Equilibrium Growth
The government chooses six ﬁscal policy parameters: the educational time in-
put, uh, two of the three expenditure proportions, θj (j = k,h,d), and the three
13The assumption of homotheticity ensures that uq is constant in equilibrium so that if H∗
is constant, H∗
q is also constant.
6proportional tax rates tr,t w, and tc. Changes in the public investment expen-
diture parameters, θk and θh, both have positive direct eﬀects on equilibrium
growth (by initially raising ˙ K and ˙ H respectively) and negative indirect eﬀects
via reductions in the relevant factor returns, r or wuq.
3.1 Direct and Indirect Eﬀects
To assess the role of ﬁscal policy, the following result can be established, as












This result clearly shows the importance for growth of the time spent in education,
uh. It also demonstrates that the three tax rates have positive direct eﬀects on
equilibrium growth through the impact on investment in physical and human
capital of higher tax revenues. However, they also have indirect labour supply
eﬀects to the extent that they aﬀect the endogenous pre-tax wage, the proportion
of human capital devoted to labour supply and the income share of capital.
The social transfer, D, does not appear in (12), but increases in θk and θh
imply a reduction in the share of revenues allocated to transfers. Therefore, in
common with Barro (1990), D has no direct eﬀect on equilibrium growth. But
an increase in D ﬁnanced by a commensurate increase in income or consumption
tax revenues is harmful for growth to the extent that there are disincentives to
labour supply.15
It is convenient to drop asterisks from equilibrium values and work with the
elasticity of equilibrium growth (d ˙ Q/ ˙ Q) with respect to each policy parameter.
Denoting the total elasticity of x with respect to y as ηx,y,d i ﬀerentiation of (12)
for each policy parameter, say b, gives the general form:













where W = wuq measures wage income per unit of total human capital. Provided
labour supply is upward sloping, w and uq are positively correlated so that an
increase in either component raises W,a n dvice versa.16
14This appears to suggest no direct growth eﬀect from the investment proportion, θk.T h i s
is only because ˙ Q∗ is expressed in terms of w and uq. In view of the joint endogeneity of
various terms, growth can alternatively be expressed in terms of the capital return, r, whereby







. The negative indirect eﬀect of an increase in θk occurs via
a reduction in r.
15Unlike Mendoza et al. (1997), ﬁnancing increased D by raising consumption taxes has
similar eﬀects to using income taxes because of the absense of private savings here.
16This condition is suﬃcient but not necessary since W r i s e sa sl o n ga sηuq,w > −1.
73.2 Human Capital Investment
Equation (13) demonstrates the importance of the human capital input param-
eter, αh, for the magnitude of the elasticities: the more important is human
capital into its own production, the greater are the potential endogenous growth
eﬀects. The lower is αh, the less human capital growth relies on the ability to
raise tax revenues. The fact that human capital is an input in its own accumu-
lation function, unlike physical capital, means that the growth eﬀects of θk and
θh are not symmetric.
For the extreme case where αh =0only human capital is used in its own
production and ˙ Q = Ahuh. The human capital appropriated by the government
for education is the sole determinant of equilibrium growth. Physical capital
accumulation and ﬁscal policy variables are irrelevant, and education policy is all
important. Fiscal variables aﬀect the level of output via eﬀects on equilibrium
factor proportions. This outcome is similar to the Lucas (1988) result (omitting
externalities to human capital) but in his case the proportion, uh, is chosen by
optimising individuals.17
For the other extreme case where αh =1 , it can be shown that ˙ Q =
˙ H = AhQh/H = AhθhR/H, so that the accumulation processes for human
and physical capital are now similar, and the equilibrium factor endowment ra-
tio is determined entirely by the government’s choice of expenditure proportions
(K∗/H∗ = θk/Ahθh).
Human capital expenditures have direct and indirect eﬀects on growth. The
indirect eﬀect depends on how changes in θh aﬀect labour supply via changes to
capital and wage income in (6). For example, an increase in θh reduces the K/H
ratio which, from (10), implies a fall in wuq/r (and an absolute fall in wuq)i n
equilibrium.18 From (12), this latter eﬀect impacts negatively on the equilibrium
growth rate.
The direct and indirect eﬀects are illustrated by the following results, obtained
from (12):
η ˙ Q,uh =1 − αh(1 − ηW,uh)




These elasticities include the terms ηW,uh and ηW,θh which capture the indirect
eﬀects associated with the labour supply/rental rate adjustments required for
17See Lucas (1988, equations 20 and 21), who also ﬁnds steady-state growth is fully deter-
mined by the proportion of time allocated to education. This result on the ineﬀectiveness of
ﬁscal policy mirrors that found by Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998) where leisure is quality
time, only human capital is used in human capital production and education is untaxed — the
conditions that hold in this case.
18It can be shown that an increase in H,f o rg i v e nK, which reduces wuq/r must also
increase r and reduce wuq. This can also be seen from the fact that the rise in H raises the
average and marginal returns to capital.
8equilibrium.19 Hence the signs of the partial eﬀects involving W in (14) depend
on how ﬁscal policy adjustments initially aﬀect the relative growth of K and H.
For human capital, ηW,θh < 0 in (14), but an upward sloping labour supply curve
(ηuq,w > 0)i sas u ﬃcient condition to ensure that negative indirect eﬀects do
not outweigh positive direct eﬀects. This follows by noting that in equilibrium
η ˙ Q,θh = η ˙ H,θh, and, from (14):
η ˙ H,θh = αh(1 + ηw, ˙ Hη ˙ H,θh)
= αh/(1 − αhηw, ˙ H) (15)
An upward sloping labour supply curve ensures that ηw, ˙ H < 0; hence η ˙ H,θh > 0.
Consider the growth eﬀects of increasing the proportion of time allocated to
education. As mentioned above, this is negatively related to αh,w i t h ˙ Q = Ahuh
for αh =0 . However, from (14), η ˙ Q,uh could be positive or negative depending on
t h es i z eo fαh a n dt h es i z ea n ds i g no fηW,uh. The pure income eﬀect associated
with an increase in uh, together with homothetic preferences, ensures that w
and uq both fall; hence ηW,uh < 0. Thus larger labour-education substitutions
have a ceteris paribus lowering eﬀect on equilibrium growth in response to an
increase in uh,a n dg r o w t hi sl o w e ri fαh(1 − ηW,uh) > 1. Such a situation can
arise where negative labour supply eﬀects, in association with large αh, dominate
the growth-enhancing eﬀects of increased human capital accumulation. That is,
while raising uh raises ˙ H and thereby the potential wage-income tax base, wH,i t
simultaneously reduces tax revenues by reducing the proportion of human capital
available for production of ﬁnal output. Therefore uh is eﬀectively the tax rate on
human capital, H, with the relationship between uh and ˙ Q representing a form
of Laﬀer curve whereby growth rates and revenues are low at very high and low
values of uh. The model also highlights the fact that human capital is eﬀectively
taxed twice when the government appropriates educational time inputs: it is
taxed once directly at rate uh, and again at rate tw on the income from human
capital net of “education tax” and leisure, wuqH.
Raising the tax rates, tr, tw, tc, also produces growth-enhancing eﬀects via
increased revenues for investment (for given θk, θh) and negative indirect eﬀects
via labour supply incentives.





where i = r,w; where i = c, the tax rate is replaced by tc/(1 + tc).H e n c et h e
net response of growth to increases in tax rates is positive only if the elasticity
of W with respect to the relevant tax exceeds −1.
19For physical capital, η ˙ Q,θk = αhηW,θk > 0.
9Table 1: Benchmark Values For Simulations
Fiscal parameters Other parameters
Wage tax rate, tw 0.25 Production function elasticity, αq 0.70
Capital income tax rate, tr 0.10 Production technology, Aq 1.0
Goods tax rate, tc 0.10 Utility function elasticity, αc 0.66
Expenditure proportions: Human capital elasticity, αh 0.70
Physical capital, θk 0.1 Human capital technology, Ah 1.0
Human capital, θh 0.2
Social transfers, θd 0.7
Education proportion, uh 0.15
4 Some Policy Simulations
This section provides numerical examples to examine the orders of magnitude
of alternative ﬁscal policies, examining both steady-state and transitional re-
sponses.20
4.1 A Benchmark Case
Parameter values for a benchmark case are given in Table 1. This sets tw =0 .25,
and tc = tr =0 .1. Choosing a wage tax rate is complicated by the fact that
marginal income tax rates in practice are typically much higher than average
r a t e so ft a x( e s p e c i a l l yi nL D C s ) ,w h e r e a si nt h em o d e la l lt a x e sa r ep r o p o r t i o n a l .
Though 0.25 is higher than typical average wage tax rates it is more plausible as a
marginal rate, which is more relevant to explore labour supply eﬀects. In practice
in LDCs, consumption taxes are often more important than personal income
taxes, though labour supply eﬀects of both forms of tax can be expected to be
similar (and in the model are identical). Taxes on the beneﬁts from consumption
of public capital are implicit and diﬃcult to quantify in practice; benchmark
simulations set tr =0 .10.
The key issue in setting values for the public expenditure proportions is dis-
tinguishing those expenditures which contribute to private sector productivity
from those which aﬀect utility. Benchmark simulations assume that 30%a n d
70% of expenditures are productivity and utility enhancing respectively, with the
education expenditures twice those of physical capital investment. A benchmark
case of uh =0 .15 is selected. Other benchmark parameters reﬂect standard
assumptions regarding factor income shares and leisure preferences. The educa-
tion production function is diﬃcult to specify, but αh =0 .70 was adopted for
20The computer program (written in Fortran) is available from the authors.

























the benchmark case, giving a steady-state growth rate of just under 2.6%p e r
period.
4.2 Time Spent in Education
The above analysis suggested that a Laﬀer curve eﬀect can be expected as
the education proportion, uh, is varied; this is displayed in Figure 1. Using
benchmark values for other parameters suggests a growth-maximising human
capital allocation of around 30% to education (proﬁle E), rising to around 50% if
human capital inputs are more important for human capital accumulation (proﬁle
F,w h e r eαh =0 .5). These numbers are greater than likely to be observed in
practice, though of course policy objectives other than growth maximisation are
likely to play a role in determining public education provision.
4.3 Changing Expenditure Allocations
The growth trade-oﬀ between the two productive expenditures on human and
physical capital is illustrated in Figure 2 which shows alternative combinations of
the proportions, θk and θh, which yield constant growth. Starting with the bench-
mark values (θk =0 .1; θh =0 .2), proﬁle G represents a form of iso-growth curve,
depicting combinations of θk and θh yielding a constant steady-state growth rate































of 0.026.21 The sum, θk +θh, identiﬁes the remaining public resources available
for social transfers, and the minimum point on proﬁle G0 indicates that the maxi-
mum resources available for social transfers without reducing long-run growth is,
by coincidence, close to the benchmark values of θk + θh ≈ 0.3.T h e s ep r o ﬁles
are not aﬀected by changes in αh (the elasticity of human capital production
with respect to inputs of Q) ,t h o u g ht h ev a l u eo ft h eg r o w t hr a t ed i ﬀers from
the benchmark case.
Proﬁles H and H0 show that the θk, θh trade-oﬀ is aﬀected by changes in the
importance of human capital in the private sector production function (αq). In
particular, proﬁle H (lower αq) is everywhere steeper than proﬁle G (higher αq).
This indicates that reallocating a given proportion of expenditure from physical
capital towards human capital requires a greater increase in the latter to maintain
growth constant if the human capital-output elasticity is lower (proﬁle H).
21These proﬁles are obtained using an iterative procedure to ﬁnd the required reductions in
θk necessary to maintain constant growth for speciﬁed increases in θh.




























A:  tw  (benchmark)
B:  tw  (αc = 0.5)
C:  tw  (αc = 0.5; tr = 0)
D:  tr  (benchmark)
134.4 Changing Tax Rates
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the equilibrium growth rate and the tax
rate on wage income.22 These results reveal a similar pattern to those produced
by the Barro (1990) model whereby the positive growth eﬀects of productive
expenditure enabled by increased tax rates initially dominate the negative growth
eﬀects of income taxes via disincentives. However, whereas in the Barro (1990)
case disincentive eﬀects operate via disincentives to accumulate physical capital,
here it is disincentives to labour supply which eventually cause the proﬁles to
turn down. Proﬁle A, the benchmark case, suggests a growth maximum at
around 3.5% associated with a wage tax rate of 0.65. However, lower tax rates
do not involve a large growth sacriﬁce (for example, ˙ Q =2 .9%a ttw =0 .35).
With a greater leisure preference (proﬁle B; αc =0 .5) maximum growth of 2.7%
occurs at tw =0 .60.P r o ﬁle C (where tr =0 ) suggests that the growth eﬀects of
allowing for capital income taxation are quite small. Proﬁle D shows how changes
in tr aﬀect growth (for tw =0 .25), and is approximately linear since there are no
disincentive eﬀects here to counteract the positive expenditure-enhancing eﬀects
of additional tax revenues.23
4.5 Transitional Dynamics
The transitional dynamics are, as shown in the Appendix, determined by tax rev-
enue and labour supply eﬀects. Shocks which generate divergences between the
growth rates of tax revenue, and human and physical capital initiate convergent
tendencies. Figure 4 shows the dynamic eﬀects of reallocating public expendi-
tures towards human capital by raising θh from 0.2 to 0.25. The increase in θh
immediately raises the growth rate of human capital above that for physical cap-
ital. This in turn causes a rise in the capital growth rate but a fall in the human
capital growth rate, re-establishing an equilibrium growth rate around 2.93%,
with a half-life of about 36 years. This refers to the time taken for adjustment to
a new equilibrium after the change induced by the initial shock. They are similar
to the commonly estimated convergence rate of 2% per annum which translates
into a half-life of 35 years; see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, pp.26-38). Despite
this length of time, the output growth rate is seen to move quickly to a value
that is relatively close to its ﬁnal equilibrium.
22Given the correspondence noted earlier between tw and tc/(1 + tc), growth eﬀects from
changes in tw and tc are similar.
23Some secondary disincentive eﬀects occur with tr to the extent that capital income taxes
change relative factor prices and hence labour supply decisions. Simulations suggest these are
small.

























This paper has examined the role of publicly provided and tax-ﬁnanced human
capital accumulation in the context of a general equilibrium endogenous growth
model. A key diﬀerence from previous models of endogenous human capital
accumulation in the Lucas (1988, 1990) tradition is that schooling is compul-
sory and therefore exogenous to the representative individual.24 Consumption
and labour supply choices are based on maximisation of a static (single period)
utility function. Arguably these assumptions are more relevant for a developing
country seeking to extend compulsory schooling. Education and public physi-
cal capital investment are ﬁnanced from taxes on wage and capital income, and
consumption.
Direct and indirect eﬀects of increasing both the proportion of time devoted
to education, and the proportion of tax revenue used in human capital production,
were identiﬁed. It was found that, as in the models of Lucas (1988, 1990), Stokey
and Rebelo (1995) and Milesi-Feretti and Roubini (1998), the speciﬁcation of the
human capital production function and the strength of labour supply eﬀects are
important for the magnitude of steady-state outcomes. In addition, with an
endogenous supply of labour, the proportion of time compulsorily devoted to
24The analysis assumed that the compulsion is eﬀective.
15education acts as a form of distortionary tax on human capital.
Numerical analyses found that, for benchmark parameter values, the growth
maximising wage tax rate appear to be somewhat higher than those observed in
practice, but the growth sacriﬁce associated with lower tax rates is not large.
In the absence of incentives to private accumulation in the model, growth-
maximising tax rate predictions should be treated with caution. Nevertheless,
the model points to the possibility that, where taxes are used partly to fund
growth-enhancing expenditures, growth-maximising tax rates can be quite high,
even allowing for strong labour supply responses.
Finally it was shown that the model’s transitional dynamics have strong con-
vergence properties in response to ﬁscal policy changes. These arise essentially
because the government budget constraint ensures that tax revenues, and public
physical and human capital accumulation, are jointly endogenously determined.
As a result, any divergences between their rates of growth are temporary. Sim-
ulations using plausible labour supply assumptions suggest typical half-lives of
around 30-40 years; that is, similar to empirical regression-based estimates.
16Appendix: The Dynamics of The Model
This appendix examines the dynamic properties of the model. Given the nature
of the interdependencies in this general equilibrium framework, it is not possible
to solve analytically for the equilibrium output and prices. This also applies to the
dynamics. However, output growth can be expressed in terms of what Mendoza
et al (1997) refer to as semi-reduced forms. Such equations for output growth
yield insights into the inﬂuence of ﬁscal policies on equilibrium growth.
As stated above, steady-state growth requires:
˙ Q
∗ = ˙ K
∗ = ˙ H
∗ = ˙ R
∗ (17)
Endogenous steady-state growth also requires ˙ Q∗ to be positive and constant.
Given the constant returns to reproducible factors, K and H,i n( 1 ) ,t h i si s
achieved if accumulation functions are linear (non-decreasing), which depends





and combining (2) with the second line of (3):






From the steady-state deﬁnition in (17), if an equilibrium growth rate exists,
(R/H)∗ and (R/K)∗ are both positive constants yielding self-sustaining growth.
Equating (18) and (19), it can be shown that:
˙ Q









In equilibrium K∗/H∗ is constant and hence, for given technological and ﬁscal
parameters, ˙ Q∗ is a positive constant.25
25It was argued above that tax revenue in this model can be expected to display some of
the properties of private savings in conventional endogenous growth models. This is shown by









Since R/pQ captures the compulsory saving rate, this shows that equilibrium growth is a
positive function of the saving rate and the H/K ratio, as in Rebelo (1991). Not all of
these compulsory savings are devoted to investment, as the government spends on social
transfers. A broader concept of compulsory saving could be employed here, as in Rebelo
(1991), to include the compulsory fraction of time, uh, used for educational investment, such
that: S/pQ =( R − D + uhwH)/pQ.
17Substitute for K∗/H∗ in (20) to obtain an alternative semi-reduced form in
terms of exogenous tax rates and the endogenous labour supply variables, w and
uq. Using (10) and (4), equation (12) can be obtained, after some re-arranging.
It is also necessary to examine whether the income growth resulting from
arbitrarily chosen ﬁscal parameters converges towards the steady-state rate or
whether initial ﬁscal policy choices display knife-edge properties. First, equating











in equilibrium, so that for given αq:
˙ w + ˙ Hq = ˙ r + ˙ K (22)
Diﬀerentiating the expression for total tax revenue in (4) gives:
˙ R = β
³




˙ w + ˙ Hq
´
+( 1− β − γ) ˙ Q (23)
where β and γ are the shares of rental and wage income tax revenues in total tax
revenue respectively. Hence, in the steady-state, where (22) holds, ˙ R = ˙ Q.O u t
of equilibrium, revenue growth may exceed or fall short of output growth unless
uniform income tax rates apply.26
To examine transition properties, consider an initial equilibrium in which ˙ Q∗ =
˙ K∗ = ˙ H∗.As h o c kt oaﬁscal parameter, such as an increase in the proportion
of revenues allocated to capital investment, θk,c a u s e s : ˙ K> ˙ Q> ˙ H.F o rt h e
case of uniform tax rates, ˙ R = ˙ Q and therefore ˙ K> ˙ R> ˙ H, implying that
R/K must fall and R/H must rise. Equations (18) and (19) show that this
induces a reduction in ˙ K and an increase in ˙ H, that is, a convergence towards
equilibrium. If ﬁscal policy were to cause both factor inputs to grow more slowly
than output (for example ˙ K< ˙ H< ˙ Q = ˙ R), R/K and R/H would both rise,
restoring equilibrium.
In the case of non-uniform income tax rates, a shock away from the steady-
state may cause ˙ R to exceed or fall short of ˙ Q. However, what matters for the
transitional dynamics is the relation of ˙ R to ˙ K and ˙ H. As with the uniform
tax case, if ˙ R< ˙ K, ˙ H then R/K and R/H both rise until ˙ R∗ = ˙ H∗ = ˙ K∗,
restoring equality with ˙ Q∗. A converse equilibrating process occurs if ˙ R> ˙ K, ˙ H.
However, if initially, ˙ K< ˙ R< ˙ H, ˙ K rises and ˙ H falls to restore equilibrium.27
26This can be seen by diﬀerentiating (4) for the uniform income tax rate case to give:
˙ R =( β + γ)
³
˙ r + ˙ K + ˙ w + ˙ Hq
´
+( 1− (β + γ)) ˙ Q = ˙ Q
27Revenue growth does not in general remain constant during the transitional process since
˙ R is a positive function of ˙ K and ˙ H.
18Consider, for example, a case where a fall in θk leads to a reduction in ˙ K
from an initial equilibrium in which ˙ R∗ = ˙ Q∗ = ˙ K∗ = ˙ H∗. The reduction
in ˙ K reduces revenue growth but by less than the fall in ˙ K. This is because
capital income is only one source of tax revenue and because relative factor price
adjustments ensure that the growth of capital income, rK, falls by less than
the growth of the capital stock.28 As a result, the higher revenue-to-capital
ratio, R/K, generates a temporary increase in capital growth so long as the
new investment proportion, θk, remains unchanged. Thus a new steady-state is
established in which all variables grow at a lower rate. The transitional dynamics
of the model are therefore essentially determined ﬁrst by the government’s budget
which determines the pace of factor accumulation; and secondly labour supply
responses to the associated relative factor price changes.
28The shock to capital growth via the reduction in θk has no eﬀect on human capital growth
but aﬀects the human capital used in production of Q, as relative factor price changes (due
to reduced ˙ K) induce labour supply changes.
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